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What is a Witness Seminar? 
 
Michael D Kandiah 
 
 
 It is an exercise in oral history that may be best described as a group interview or a guided 
discussion. 
 Key participants meet around the seminar table to discuss and debate the issues relating to 
the chosen topic as they remember them. As a group interview, the discussion: 
o is guided and, where necessary, limited by the Chair, who is usually but not always 
an academic; and 
o will be shaped the ‘group dynamic’: individual speakers will respond to each 
other, to the Chair and the presence of the audience. 
 Some academics are keen on observing and analysing this group effect, which has been 
identified as ‘a kind of “chaining” or “cascading” effect; talk links to, or tumbles out of, 
the topics and expressions preceding it’.1 
 It shares certain similarities with a focus group, insofar as they are both considered group 
discussions or interviews. However, this is where the similarity ends. Participants in 
witness seminars are chosen for their role in, or ability to comment about, the subject of 
the witness seminar and they are not anonymous—indeed it is essential to know who they 
are to properly understand and analyse their testimony. Additionally, individuals in the 
group generally know each other, which makes the ‘group dynamic’ effect particularly 
interesting and important. Furthermore, this allows the testimony of participants to be 
checked, challenged and defended. 
 A witness seminar is taped and transcribed. Participants are allowed to redact the transcript 
principally to improve readability and to clarify meaning. An agreed version is published 
and archived for the use of researchers. 
 The aim of a witness seminar is to bring together participants or ‘witnesses’—to re-
examine and reassess key aspects of, and events in, recent history; to comment, examine 
and assess developments in the recent past. 
 A further aim of a witness seminar is to capture nuances of individual and group 
experiences that cannot be found in, or are absent from, documents or written material. 
 
Since its founding in 1986, the Institute of Contemporary British History (ICBH) has been 
uniquely associated with the production of witness seminars on events or developments that 
have taken place within the bounds of living memory. The ICBH Witness Seminar Programme 
has been copied by other institutions, both in Britain and abroad, and the ICBH regularly 
collaborates with scholars from other institutions in planning and hosting witness seminars of 
particular relevance to their work. 
                                                 









Dr TC Mills, University of Lancaster 
and 
Dr MD Kandiah, ICBH, King’s College London 
 
 
This witness seminar examined British diplomacy in Latin America from the 1990s to the present 
day by drawing on the testimonies and perspectives of those who served in key diplomatic 
postings in the region during this period. 
 
 In November 2010 the British Foreign Secretary William Hague pledged to ‘halt the 
decline in Britain’s diplomatic presence in Latin America’. In its place he promised that Britain 
would pursue ‘intensified and equal partnerships with countries in Latin America’.2 With this 
statement Hague acknowledged both the steep decline in Britain’s status in Latin America over 
the course of the twentieth century and a new determination to reverse this process at the 
opening of the twenty-first.  
 
 Britain certainly has experienced a loss of power and influence in Latin America in recent 
times. From the middle of the nineteenth century to the onset of the First World War Britain 
was the leading external power in Latin America, securing important export markets, establishing 
itself as the chief customer for many of the region’s primary raw materials and investing heavily 
in public utilities like telecommunications and railways. From this point onwards, however, 
Britain’s economic interests and its political influence in Latin America dwindled. This decline in 
influence occurred for a number of reasons. As Britain’s economic power in the world lessened 
generally, investments in Latin America became unprofitable and British exporters were unable 
to compete with rivals such as Germany and the United States.3.  
 
In the political realm Latin America was viewed for much of the second half of the 
twentieth century as an area dominated by the influence of the United States. More generally, 
Latin America was often viewed as a region of secondary importance to Britain’s global interests 
in the late twentieth century.4 The neglect of Latin America in British foreign policy has been 
mirrored in the lack of attention paid to British diplomacy in this region by scholars. The most 
recent era to be examined in scholarly works on this subject the Thatcher government’s policy 
towards Latin America in the 1980s.5 
                                                 
2 William Hague, ‘Britain and Latin America: Historic Friends, Future Partners’, speech by William Hague, Canning 
House, London, 9 November 2010: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-and-latin-america-historic-
friends-future-partners [Accessed 5 Nov. 2015]. 
3 Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Longman, 1993). 
3 David Thomas, ‘The United States Factor in British Relations with Latin America’, in Victor Bulmer-Thomas ed., 
Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 69-82. 
4 Leslie Bethel, ‘Britain and Latin America in Historical Perspective’, in Bulmer-Thomas ed., Britain and Latin 
America, pp.21-2.   
5 James Ferguson and Jenny Pearce (eds.), The Thatcher Years: Britain and Latin America (London: The Latin American 
Bureau, 1988); William D. Rogers, ‘The “Unspecial Relationship” in Latin America’, in Roger Louis and Bull Hedley 
(eds), The ‘Special Relationship’: Anglo-American Relations since 1945, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). Sally Ann 
Treharne, Reagan and Thatcher’s Special Relationship: Latin America and Anglo-American Relations (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 




 Recent years have, however, seen many of the trends which led British officials to shun 
Latin America showing signs of change. Following the financial crisis of 2007-8 there is a 
renewed determination in Britain to rebalance the country’s economy by boosting overseas trade 
and investment. At the same time, Latin America is emerging from beneath the shadow of the 
United States as a region of the world of increasing economic and political importance. Three of 
the G20 economies are now located in Latin America and Mexico and Brazil, in particular, are 
playing an increasingly prominent role in international diplomacy. 
 
 These developments have led to a new focus on Latin America in British foreign policy. 
Following Hague’s speech in 2010 the Foreign Office opened a new Embassy in Paraguay and a 
new consulate in Recife, Brazil. There have also been a number of recent high profile visits to 
Latin America by British ministers, including a trip to Brazil by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
George Osborne in 2014. Alongside these political efforts British business has begun to show a 
renewed interest in Latin America, with companies such as Balfour Beatty and Rolls Royce 
among those to launch new ventures in the region in recent years. British ‘soft power’ has also 
been exerted in Latin America with visits to the region by Prince Harry and the inauguration of 
various cultural exchange programmes taking place.  
 
 But notwithstanding these renewed efforts, diplomacy in Latin America still raises 
significant challenges for Britain. British commerce is dwarfed by leading powers in the region 
like the USA – as well as new powers like China – and continues to face stiff competition from 
other European countries. . Political developments in Latin America – like the emergence of the 
so-called ‘pink tide’ governments– pose new challenges for Britain. And old issues of contention 
– like the continued dispute with Argentina over the status of the Falkland Islands – remain. As 
such British diplomacy in Latin America at the turn of the twenty-first century faces both 
challenges and opportunities.  
 
 Since 1986 the ICBH Witness Seminar Programme has conducted nearly 100 witness 
seminars on a variety of subjects. These witness seminars have been well received by the 
academic community, who have increasingly come to see that it is important to examine and 
analyse how Embassies and High Commissions have worked historically in the promotion of 
British policy overseas. The significance of history and the importance of gathering and utilising 
oral history interviews have also been identified in the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
The Role of the FCO in UK Government (published 29 April 2011). In oral evidence Foreign 
Secretary William Hague stated: ‘history is vitally important in knowledge and practice of foreign 
policy’. He further stated, ‘One of the things that I have asked to be worked up is a better 
approach to how we use the alumni of the Foreign Office, [and] … continue to connect them 
more systematically to the Foreign Office.’ This Witness Seminar provides an opportunity to 






Issues for Discussion 
 
The following list is indicative of the broad areas we hoped would be commented upon by 
participants during the witness seminar.  
 
1. Britain’s primary interests in Latin America (economic / political) and how these have 
changed over time. 
 
2. The impact of Britain’s declining economic and political status in Latin America on 
diplomacy in the region. 
 
3. The issue of human rights in Latin America and the fallout from authoritarian regimes of 





4. The rise to power of left-wing governments in Latin America, including those in 
 Venezuela (Hugo Chávez, 199902-13; Nicolás Maduro (2013-present) 
 Brazil (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 2003–11; Dilma Rousseff, 2011–present) 
 Bolivia (Evo Morales, 2006–present) 
 Nicaragua (Daniel Ortega, 2007–present) 
 Argentina (Néstor Kirchner, 2003–2007; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, 2007–
present) 
 Uruguay (Tabaré Vázquez, 2005–2010, 2015-present; José Mujica, 2010–2015) 
 
5. The ongoing dispute between Britain and Argentina over the status of the Falkland 
Islands. 
 
6. Relations between Britain and other external powers with interests in Latin America, 
including: 
 USA  
 China 
 The European Union and individual European countries 
 
7. Relations between Britain and regional bodies in Latin America, including: 
 The Organisation of American States (OAS) 
 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)  
 Caribbean Community (Caricom) 
 Union of South American Nations (UNISAR) 
 Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) 
 Mercosur 
 
8. The impact of broader global developments on Britain’s role in Latin America, including: 
 The end of the Cold War  
 The War on Terror  




9. The increasing importance of Latin America in the global economy and attempts to 
increase British trade and investment in the region. 
 
10. The impact of the rising political influence of Latin American countries (particularly 






NOTE: The following was provided to all participants before the witness seminar and was not meant to provide an 
exhaustive chronology of Latin America since 1990. It was intended to help refresh people’s memories by covering 
major events and milestones in the history of the region, with reference, where relevant, to the UK and to significant 
world events.  
 
1990 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) lost election to 
Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua. 
Democratic civilian government replaced rule by Augusto 
Pinochet in Chile. 
Diplomatic relations restored between UK and Argentina. 
 
1991 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of 
Asuncion to form Mercosur.7 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolved, bringing an 
end to the Cold War. 
 
1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords ended civil war in El Salvador.8 
Cheddi Jagan’s People’s Progressive Party won election in 
Guyana. 
 
1994 The USA, Mexico and Canada signed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).9 
The Zapatista revolt erupted in Chiapas, Mexico. 
 
1995 Cenapa War between Ecuador and Peru. 
 
1996 Peace agreement bought to an end Guatemalan Civil War. 
 
1998 Hugo Chávez elected President of Venezuela. 
Augusto Pinochet arrested in UK on charges of human rights 
violations. 
 
2000 Ricardo Lagos elected President of Chile. 
                                                 
6 Compiled by Thomas Mills using a variety of open access online sources, which have been acknowledged where 
appropriate.  
7 http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp [Accessed 7 Jan. 2015]. 
8 http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SV_920116_ChapultepecAgreement.pdf [Accessed 7 
Jan. 2015].  
9 http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta 
[Accessed 7 Jan. 2015]. 
8 
 
Vincente Fox elected President of Mexico. 
 
2001 US President George W Bush launched war on terror in response 
to terrorist attacks on USA. 
Riots in Argentina fuelled by economic crisis lead to the 
resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa. 
 
2002 Attempted military coup failed to remove Hugo Chávez from 
power in Venezuela. 
 
2003 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva elected President of Brazil. 
Néstor Kirchner elected President of Argentina. 
Brazilian government issued Brasilia Declaration with India and 
South Africa.10 
 
2004 CAFTA-DR trade agreement signed between the USA, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic.11 
Brazil launched first rocket into space 
 
2006 Evo Morales elected President of Bolivia. 
Michelle Bachelet elected President of Chile. 
Fidel Castro effectively handed over power to Vice President of 
Cuba Raúl Castro due to ill health. 
Rio de Janeiro was chosen to host the 2016 Olympic Games. 
 
2007 Daniel Ortega elected President of Nicaragua. 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner elected President of Argentina. 
 
2008 Global financial crisis began. 
 
2009 Same-sex marriage legalised in Mexico City. 
 
2010 Dilma Rousseff elected President of Brazil. 
Major rescue operation mounted to save 33 Chilean miners from 
cave-in of mine. 
EU-Mercosur Free Trade agreement negotiations began. 
                                                 
10 http://ibsa.nic.in/brasil_declaration.htm [Accessed 8 Jan. 2015]. 
11 http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta 




2012 Venezuela admitted to Mercosur. 
Peace talks began between the Colombian Government and 
FARC. 
 
2013 Hugo Chávez died of cancer and was succeeded by Vice 
President Nicolás Maduro. 
Large scale protests over public services occur throughout Brazil.  
Cannabis legalised in Uruguay. 
Falklands Islands sovereignty referendum held.12 
 
 
2014 Brazil hosted the football World Cup. 
HRH Prince Harry of Wales visited Chile and Brazil.13 
Anti-government protests occurred in Venezuela.  
Mexican government arrested ‘drug-lord’ Vicente Carrillo 
Fuentes.  
Work began by Hong Kong-based company on the Nicaragua 
Canal to link the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. 
 
                                                 
12 http://www.falklands.gov.fk/home/referendum-2013/ [Accessed 8 Jan. 2015]. 
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ROBERT CAPURRO Just a very brief welcome from me to all of you. Ladies and 
gentlemen, distinguished Ambassadors, former Governors, 
welcome to Canning House. It is a great pleasure and an honour 
for us to have such a distinguished panel and audience today for 
this Latin American Diplomacy Witness Seminar. As you know, 
this is very much part of what we love to do in promoting 
Canning House. It is good to see you all here in our new Canning 
House, although many of you will not have been here before. We 
are up and running, and back to business. We are growing and 
doing more and more, so thank you very much for your support. 
I will not say any more and I will not steal Baroness Hooper’s 
thunder. I would like to hand you over briefly to Tom Mills. 




[ICBH] Witness seminars have been running for almost 30 years 
now and have explored various historical events of importance by 
bringing together practitioners involved in those events to reflect 
on and analyse them. Today, we are exploring British diplomacy 
in Latin America at the turn of the twenty-first century, so, over 
the next hour or so, we shall hear from our panel. I will allow 
them to introduce themselves, but we are very lucky to have five 
diplomats who have served in a variety of key posts throughout 
Latin America over the course of the past 25 years. 
 Without any further ado, I will hand over to our Chair for 




Thank you. I also extend a very warm welcome to everybody 
here. Canning House is the place that brings Latin America and 
the United Kingdom together, and I think this is going to be 
another example of that. I am going to ask the panel to introduce 
themselves, and perhaps I should start by introducing myself. I 
am Gloria Hooper. I am a Vice President currently of Canning 
House, but I was President some years ago. I am Chairman at the 
14 
 
moment of the All-Party Latin American Group in Parliament, 
which is composed of both Houses of Parliament and people 
from all parties. I first went to Latin America, dare I say it, 50 
years ago with a postgraduate fellowship, which took me to 
Ecuador and enabled me to travel around in the region. I have 
had a very strong ongoing interest in all things Latin American 
ever since. I might start at the end of the table and ask Donald 
Lamont to say what he thinks is most relevant to today’s 
proceedings about his background. 
 
DONALD LAMONT Thank you very much, Gloria. I will touch on three elements of 
my career that may have been relevant. I tend to say in after-
dinner speeches that, at a certain point in my career, in 1991, the 
Foreign Office looked at my CV and saw that I spoke French, 
German and Russian – no Spanish – and I had never dealt with a 
country with which we had diplomatic relations either in London 
or overseas. Why the Foreign Office thought such an 
incompetent… should be sent to Uruguay – Uruguay had done 
no wrong – I do not know, but, in 1991, I was sent out with, 
quickly learned Spanish and spent three very happy years in 
Uruguay. There was no drama in those three years, so the one 
feature perhaps worth mentioning that is relevant here is that we 
were fortunate at that time – thanks largely to the efforts of the 
Foreign Office Minister Tristan Garel-Jones,14 who knew Latin 
America very well – in having quite a number of British 
ministerial visits. 
 The next relevant posting is the Falkland Islands between 
1999 and 2002. That, at least, was a sort of logical posting, as I 
had dealt with Argentina from London as a Desk Officer and 
Deputy Head of Department immediately after the conflict, so I 
knew something about that. I went off in 1999. I hate to make 
Nigel [Haywood] jealous, but it was a very positive period of 
relations between Argentina and the Falklands. The then Foreign 
Minister of Argentina15 had spent something like 10 years trying 
to gain the confidence of the islanders, and he succeeded in that 
and we had an agreement in 1999, which we spent a couple of 
years implementing. I can wax eloquent about that, given half a 
chance, before it flattened out and went downhill rapidly. 
 From the Falklands, I went to Venezuela in 2003 for three 
years. Hugo Chávez16 was the President, so there was not a dull 
moment. We had a pretty constructive relationship, however, all 
things being considered, in part because he had twice been 
invited to the UK before I arrived, and that had certainly 
influenced his views. 
 These, then, are the three areas of responsibility I have 
                                                 
14 Tristan Garel-Jones (Lord Garel-Jones), Minister of State at the Foreign Office, 
1990-3. 
15 Guido di Tella (1931-2001), Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, 1991-9. 
16 Hugo Chávez (1954-2013), President of Venezuela, 1999-2013. 
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I am here mainly because I was Ambassador in Costa Rica. I was 
posted in 2002 and was there until 2006. In the middle, you may 
remember the Labour Government at the time decided to close 
three posts in Central America and one in South America, in 
Paraguay. They closed Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. 
They were originally going to give all three of those to be dealt 
with by the Embassy in Guatemala, but I realised that that made 
Costa Rica vulnerable, because it could possibly be the next on 
this list if they carried on with this policy, and that it made more 
sense, anyway, since Costa Rica has a border with Nicaragua and 
there are half a million Nicaraguans living in Costa Rica, that 
Nicaragua should be dealt with by the Ambassador in Costa Rica. 
I fought and won to get Nicaragua assigned as my responsibility, 
and I became non-resident Ambassador in 2004. 
 There was a problem with this, though, because the 
Department for International Development (DFID) Central 
America Office was based in Managua with quite a lot of money 
to hand out. I had very little money, as the Heads of Mission Gift 
Scheme allocation was very small. The Head of the DFID office 
was there in situ and I was sitting in Costa Rica. I can talk more 
later about how one manages that sort of difficulty. 
 My other official duties connected with Latin America 
include being Deputy Head of the Latin America Department in 
London from 1999 to 2001 before I was accredited as 
Ambassador. I also briefly spent some time in Cuba in 1971 as a 
diplomatic spouse. I was not formally employed by the Foreign 
Office then because I was one of those women diplomats who 
had to resign on marriage – that ban was lifted in 1972. It is hard 
for many young women diplomats these days to believe but, in 
those days, I hasten to say, rather longer back than I want to 
remember, I had to resign from my post as Third Secretary in the 
Paris Embassy. My husband17 had been posted to Cuba, so I 
joined him there and spent my time writing papers for our 
Research Department to keep myself and my brain going. 
 The only thing I would add at this stage is that, during the 
long period of the Labour Government18 – those years that we 
are looking at – Ministers did realise that they needed to do more 
in terms of ministerial visits to Latin America. But because it is a 
long way to go, it is difficult to get Ministers to agree to travel. I 
was, therefore, deputed to travel with Lord Levy19 as the Prime 
Minister’s Special Representative for three weeks around Latin 
America in November 2000, and I can tell you more about that, if 
you like. 
                                                 
17 Sir Stephen Wright, Third Secretary at British Embassy in Havana, 1969-71. 
18 The Labour Governments, 1997-2010. 





NIGEL HAYWOOD I am slightly out of my element here because, while I am 
surrounded by people who speak Spanish and Portuguese, my 
equivalents are Hungarian and Estonian. I have spent most of my 
time in Central and Eastern Europe, but I suppose my knowledge 
of a broader look at South America is from my time in Human 
Resources, where I visited most of the Embassies, for one reason 
or another – not to close them down, I hasten to add – with the 
notable exception of Buenos Aires. I think the reason I am here is 
that I was Governor of the Falkland Islands from 2010 until 
February last year. 
 
GILES PAXMAN I would not claim to be an expert on Latin America either. I 
started learning Spanish when I was 13. I had just read King 
Solomon’s Mines20 and decided that I wanted to go to Colombia. I 
needed to know a bit of Spanish in order to do that and took it 
up through school and university, and then had absolutely 
nothing to do with anything Hispanic throughout a long Foreign 
Office career until I was posted to Mexico in 2005. I spent four 
years in Mexico during which I witnessed an interesting transition 
of government from the Fox21 Presidency to the Calderón22 
Presidency, when the centre of Mexico City was more or less 
brought to a standstill by the left-of-centre party that refused to 
accept the results of the elections. 
 The time of the political transition was a time of 
economic stability and growth. Mexico had recovered from the 
Tequila Crisis23 and was growing pretty solidly, at 3 to 4 per cent 
a year. Public finances were under control and the country was 
generally doing pretty well. The government made some timid 
attempts at reform but did not really get very far in terms of the 
big issues around pensions and oil.  
 They also started off a ‘war on drugs’, which, of course, is 
what everyone immediately tends to think about when they think 
about Mexico these days. When I arrived in Mexico, there was 
clearly a big drugs problem and I agree that Calderón had to do 
something about it. I think ‘steady state’ was not a solution, but it 
did result in drugs-related deaths going up from about 1,000 a 
year to nearly 10,000 a year during my time there. 
 It was also a time when Mexico was trying to develop a 
global identity, and to work out what its relationship with North 
America should be. The immigration issue was right at the top of 
that agenda. The government was also trying to think through its 
relationship with the rest of Latin America. There were all sorts 
of efforts to form groupings of one sort or another, and Mexico 
                                                 
20 Sir H. Rider Haggard, King Solomon’s Mines (first published in 1895). 
21 Vincente Fox, President of Mexico, 2000-06. 
22 Felipe Calderón, President of Mexico, 2006-12. 




was very keen to make sure it had the right relationship with 
those groupings. 
 It was also a time, finally, when Britain was waking up to 
emerging economies and when, contrary to Georgina [Butler]’s 
experience, I found myself having my resources increased and 
having both people and money sent to me in Mexico to promote 
trade and investment and develop cooperation on the wider 
issues on the global agenda around climate change, sustainable 
development and good governance. 
 
HOOPER You then went on to Madrid. 
 
PAXMAN I then went on to Madrid, which, of course, is important in Latin 
American terms. I spent four years in Madrid but I cannot claim 
to have had much to do with Latin America while I was there; I 
was much more involved in trade and investment and European 
economic issues, and dealing with recurrent problems over 
Gibraltar. 
 
DR PETER S. 
COLLECOTT 
I feel I am the real cuckoo in this particular nest, insofar as I 
certainly was not a Latin Americanist, which, for reasons I can go 
into, was part of the reason why I was posted to Brazil. I was 
there as Ambassador from 2004 until the end of 2008, which was 
half of the first period of Lula’s24 Presidency and half of the 
second period of Lula’s presidency. I think I shall end there. 
 
HOOPER A couple of things have been left out. Since this is a discussion 
on diplomacy, Donald [Lamont] was also a Director of Wilton 
Park,25 which is the Foreign Office conference centre, and so he 
covered many regions of the world. Peter is, of course, also a 
Trustee of Canning House. 
 Looking at this audience, you are all very well-informed, 
so I do not need to go into any detail to emphasise the 
importance of the markets of Latin American countries to this 
country, and the importance of our bilateral relationship with 
each country: the historic links, which go back 200 years to the 
support that the British gave to the various independence 
movements; the founding of the Chilean and Brazilian navies by 
Admiral Lord Cochrane;26 and, of course, the investment that 
happened 100 years ago, before the outbreak of the First World 
                                                 
24 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil, 2003–11. 
25 Wilton Park, an executive branch of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘is a 
forum for global change.’ https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/ [Accessed 16 Feb. 
2015]. 
26 Admiral Lord Cochrane (Admiral, 10th Earl of Dundonald, 1st Marquess of 
Maranhão, 1775-1860), Vice Admiral of Chile, 1818-22. 
18 
 
War, when Britain was the leading external country in its 
relationships with Latin America, and we were involved in 
infrastructure, railways and so on. 
 It is rather sad that, when I went 50 years ago, there were 
still major British companies involved in Latin America visible 
there and all the British banks, pretty much, were represented 
there; now, I think it is only in Brazil and Mexico that you can 
find HSBC.27 There has been a dwindling of interest and activity. 
We went through the period when Embassies were being closed, 
which Georgina [Butler] referred to. If they were not closed, they 
were downsized. Commercial departments, which I thought were 
thriving at the time, were closed down. The British Council 
seemed to disappear from many countries in Latin America, and 
that was very sad. The situation has been reversed now: we have 
reopened Embassies and we are reactivating our links, and that is 
all to the good. 
 Since our panel here were all serving diplomats during 
that period of closure and change, I would like to start the 
dialogue by posing a few questions and then opening it up to the 
floor. I would like to ask the panel whether, in their experience, 
what they went through at that time was perhaps a necessary evil. 
Maybe they have had to rethink the role of a diplomat in Latin 
America and, therefore, is it a question of ‘out of evil, there 
springs forth good.’ Would anybody like to pick that one up? 
 
BUTLER Since I was directly involved in Central America with the closure 
of three of our Posts there, shall I start? It was, to begin with, 
very difficult to persuade those countries that it was not a 
demonstration of our lack of interest in them. It is a really hard 
sell since you have clearly decided your priorities are elsewhere. 
One had to work very hard to make it clear to them that we were 
doing the best we could with reduced resources. The way I dealt 
with it in Nicaragua is I planned a visit once every two months, 
and I always made sure that we had at least three Ministerial visits 
set up. In fact, that worked very well. I often thought that, for 
those Ambassadors sitting in Managua, it was perhaps harder for 
them to get access in the way that I did to Ministers, because I 
was unusual. They did not see me very much and they did not 
bump into me at parties. You might have a quick conversation 
but you do not sit down and go through an agenda, which is what 
I did, and I covered quite a lot of ground like that. After a while, I 
think people heard that that was what I was doing and it healed 
the rift a bit. 
 I did have this particular problem of having a large DFID 
office sitting in Managua, run by a woman who had lots of money 
to give away, so it was quite difficult for me to have the same 
appeal and credibility. As Ambassador, of course, you have very 
                                                 
27 HSBC is a multinational banking group, founded in 1991 by the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation. www.hsbc.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
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little money to spend. You had your Heads of Mission allowances 
etc., but you cannot do very much with them. That, then, needed 
managing, particularly as I did not agree with the policy that 
DFID was adopting at that particular time, which was promoting 
Budget Support. This means handing over a large sum of money 
to the national Government to spend. I always thought that it was 
difficult to imagine that, the way things were in Nicaragua at that 
time, you could have sufficient conditions to protect that money 
from being spent corruptly. In the end, in fact, the proposals did 
not progress and the DFID office was closed down in 2007. 
Now, things have evolved in such a way that most of the money 
the UK gives is either through non-governmental organisations 
or through the EU. 
 Increasingly, I think it is through our relationship with our 
colleagues in the EU28 that we carried on having good relations 
with these countries, because you do rely on the EU 
Ambassadors who are resident there to help you out. In 
particular, of course, in Central America, where relations between 
these countries’ Governments and the United States is of 
paramount importance, making sure that you keep in touch with 
the US Embassy is the way that you get a lot of the information 
that you need. 
 I would like to add one more thing: as the DFID office 
was dealing with the Nicaraguan Government in Managua, with a 
programme that was big money for a mega project, I decided to 
concentrate on going to the Mosquito Coast and the autonomous 
zones of Nicaragua on most visits, which, as many of you will 
know, make up about 50 per cent of Nicaraguan territory. I did 
small but significant things there in ways that were not being 
done by the aid office. That worked very well, because I think 
they had been neglected over the years. As this region was a 
British Protectorate for several hundred years, it seemed to me 
that we owed them a little something. We did some useful work 
both in terms of trying to alleviate the problems of the ghastly 
prisons in Bluefields,29 and changing the impression that people 
there had of being rather deserted and left behind. We opened a 
museum for them in Bluefields University;30 we set up 
competitions with the schools for them to write stories about life 
on the coast, so that the youngsters felt that they had a history 
that was worth remembering. Those little things got the attention 
of the press and we had a good reaction in Nicaragua from doing 
that. 
 Good things, then, do come from what, apparently, is a 
bit of a disaster diplomatically and, in the end, I think it has 
worked very well. Now, we have a diplomatic couple living in San 
                                                 
28 The European Union: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
29 Bluefields is a city and municipality on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. 
30 Bluefields Indian and Caribbean University (BICU). www.bicu.edu.ni [Accessed 
16 Feb. 2015]. 
20 
 
José – a husband-and-wife team. The husband is the Ambassador 
to Nicaragua;31 the wife is the Ambassador to Costa Rica.32 
 
HOOPER It is a fantastic solution. I can vouch for the fact that, when I 
went with the Parliamentary mission to Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
during Georgina [Butler]’s time in charge, she was very much on 
top of things and able to cope. 
 
COLLECOTT You have put your finger on a couple of difficulties, which I 
think we need to expose. First of all, there is not and was not, 
essentially, a British policy towards Latin America. I think the 
evidence of that is really that the experience of Georgina [Butler] 
and others in the smaller countries of Spanish Latin America was 
very different from that of Giles [Paxman] and me in the two 
large countries of Latin America, if, indeed, the Brazilians allow 
us to call Brazil part of Latin America, which Leslie Bethell33 
would say only happened about 20 years ago.34 Up until then, 
Latin America was Spanish America, as far as the Brazilians were 
concerned. 
 As Giles has hinted, I certainly did not feel that I was sent 
there as part of a Latin American strategy; if anything, it was a 
strategy towards Brazil and a strategy that we had to work out for 
ourselves. It was also, as Giles has also hinted, much more about 
the large emerging economies, what we were going to do with 
them and how we were going to deal with and try to protect 
British interests in an era when the emerging economies were 
clearly looking beyond their regions and becoming key global 
players, economically and politically. 
 It seemed to me that that was the strategy that, between 
ourselves, the Embassies, and London, we had to try to work out 
and to put some rationality together. That is what I thought I was 
doing for most of my time: how to incorporate those big 
emerging powers, and to manage their transition to be more 
important global players in such a way that British interests were 
preserved to the degree that they could be. One of those interests 
would be the economic interest of being able to trade more with 
them, as their economies grew, but there was also a very wide and 
very big political interest. 
 In turn, that divergence between attitudes to the big 
emerging powers and the smaller Latin American countries led to 
this very difficult situation as far as Government/FCO resources 
in the whole Latin American area was concerned, and I speak as 
somebody who, immediately prior to going to Brazil as 
                                                 
31 CJ Campbell, British Non-Resident Ambassador to Nicaragua. 
32 Sharon Campbell, British Ambassador to Costa Rica, 2011-. 
33 Professor Leslie Bethell, Director, Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of 
Oxford, 1997-2007. 
34 See Leslie Bethell, ‘Brazil and “Latin America”,’ Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 42 No. 3 (2010), pp.457-85. 
21 
 
Ambassador, was head of the FCO Administration and, prior to 
that, the Director of Resources in the FCO. This is something 
that we had had to struggle with for a long time.  
 Essentially, I and Giles [Paxman]’s colleagues in Mexico 
were seeking, and being given, increasing resources at a time 
when the whole pot for Latin America was shrinking, and the 
consequence of that was that others were suffering quite difficult 
shrinkages of their administrative budget, for their people, and of 
their budget for programmes. Part of the result of that was these 
Embassy closures that have been talked about. I just wanted to 
give a somewhat more optimistic slant to what we were doing, 
rather than what Gloria [Hooper] was saying, which was that this 
was a depressing period and whether anything good came out of 
it. Certainly, for me in Brazil, it was a very exciting period. It was 
a very exciting time when Brazil was developing and our relations 
developed hugely throughout that period. 
 Also, to pick up another element which Giles [Paxman] 
mentioned, of those things I spent my time on, the one that I 
spent the largest proportion on was nothing to do with politics or 
economics, but climate change, by quite a long way; after that, 
probably science and technology and helping large commercial 
firms to do things. An envelope to that was the bigger strategic 
picture of what we were trying to do in terms of building our 
relationships for a future in which Brazil would be a more 
important player as far as we were concerned, but also a more 
important player on the global economic and political scene, and 
would be brought in progressively, as it has been, into instances 
of global governance – so far, economic, and not political, but 
that will happen. 
 
HOOPER Those were two very good examples of how our diplomats 
coped. 
 
PAXMAN My experience was, in many ways, very similar to Peter 
[Collecott]’s. I share Peter’s difficulty over developing a holistic 
view of Latin America. I think the Foreign Office has always had 
this problem: how do you develop a policy towards Latin 
America when you are dealing with a continent, which, although 
conveniently packaged geographically, has such huge diversity of 
wealth, economic performance, governance and political regimes 
– and, being frank, importance to Britain? We grappled with this 
in the Foreign Office, and I remember – and I think Georgina 
[Butler] and Peter [Collecott] may too – a wide-ranging study of 
why Latin America mattered to Britain and what we should try to 
do about it. Insofar as I can recall the conclusions, they were 
pretty much, ‘Let us carry on doing the same thing and see what 
happens.’ It was not world-shattering. 
 There were, however, a number of things going on at this 
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point – a number of underlying trends that did condition our 
policy: the reorganising world following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall; the decline of blocs and the rise of multi-polarity; the 
growing importance of the international system, which made 
having policies towards individual countries in Latin America 
more important. Votes in the United Nations, I think, became 
more important.  
 Globalisation was happening and, with it, the benefits that 
came from increased trade. Jim O’Neill35 invented the term 
BRICs36 in 2001. Mexico always resented not being a BRIC. They 
would have loved there to be an M in there somewhere, and they 
were told that, in fact, O’Neill had wanted to put one in but 
‘BRIC’ sounded much better than ‘MBRIC’ or whatever. Anyway, 
they thought that they were one, and London thought that they 
were one. Mexico was about the world’s ninth largest economy in 
terms of GDP in 2001. Brazil was about the same at that point. 
 
COLLECOTT Brazil was seventh and is now sixth. 
 
PAXMAN These, then, were important countries in their own terms. But we 
were also working hard on the ‘global-issues’ agenda: issues like 
climate change and sustainable development. I was given some 
money to spend on developing cooperation on these issues and 
we were running a programme worth just over £2 million, with 
projects all over the country, with three specific themes. One was 
the reform of the justice system, which was pretty dysfunctional 
in Mexico and which needed to be made to work better; 
particularly, by sharing traditions of oral justice from the UK. The 
second area was climate change, where we were supporting a 
wide variety of projects. The third area was sustainable 
development. 
 This was quite a happy coincidence of circumstances in 
many ways, because, as I said earlier, this was a time when 
Mexico was looking to find a way of projecting itself onto the 
international stage and developing an international identity. Issues 
like climate change and sustainable development, where Mexico’s 
record was pretty good, were good vehicles for doing that in a 
non-sensitive way that was not going to annoy anyone. I, as 
Ambassador, spent a lot of time dealing with those issues. In 
terms of time, I guess it was about 50/50 between dealing with 
                                                 
35 Jim O’Neill, a British economist, coined the term ‘BRICs’ in a 2001 paper 
entitled Building Better Global Economic BRICs, Global Economics Paper No. 66, for 
Goldman Sachs & Co. http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
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those global issues and promoting trade and investment. 
 I should say, on trade and investment, that UKTI37 
reviewed its strategy in 2006, and selected ten countries in the 
world that it thought were the most important priority countries 
into which resources should be put. Brazil was one and Mexico 
another, so that was another reason for increased resources 
flowing my way, for which I was very grateful. 
 
HOOPER It was, of course, the famous William Hague38 Canning Lecture39 
which pointed to an attempt at having a plan or a strategy for 
Latin America and, certainly, perhaps changed the direction of 
some of the things that we have been doing.  
 I would like to move on to another question on the 
increasing importance of Latin America in the global economy, 
and the attempts to increase British trade and investment in the 
region. In fact, we had a debate in the House of Lords this 
morning on British exports, and I was able to talk about Latin 
America, because it is a very changing place now in the sense that 
most countries are regarded as middle-income countries. There is 
a burgeoning middle class and, therefore, the expectations of 
people in those countries are changing. There was a splendid 
lecture about a week ago, which was addressed by former 
President Lagos40 of Chile, where he said that South America is 
entering a new economic cycle. Having looked back with the first 
question, perhaps we can look forward now and ask the panel if 
they would like to give us an idea of their thoughts on the future. 
 
LAMONT I am always hesitant about trying to foretell the future, but taking 
two elements in your question, my first response is, in a way, a 
continuation of what Giles was saying about the difficulty of 
wrapping something up as a packaged policy towards Latin 
America. From London, I think Venezuela was seen as mattering 
because of oil, and it was a very important market for Scotch 
whisky, for which I did my utmost. 
 One of the difficulties London had in placing Venezuela 
into a context of anything like a policy towards Latin America 
was that Venezuela was seen as an Andean country, so I would 
be invited to Heads of Mission conferences for the Andes 
countries. I might have something to say there about Colombia, 
but where Venezuela was also likely to affect our interests, of 
course, was in the Caribbean, where we have a lot of complex 
interests, and Venezuela was heavily represented there, so it was 
about ‘What was it doing?’ Venezuela was developing relations 
                                                 
37 UK Trade and Investment. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-
trade-investment [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
38 William Hague, Foreign Secretary, 2010-14. 
39 See footnote 2. 
40 Ricardo Lagos, President of Chile, 2000-6. 
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with China, certainly, as well as Iran, and it seemed to me that 
that was something that the Foreign Office found it rather 
difficult to deal with. I suggested that one day, the Americans are 
going to be asking you what you think of that development; you 
had better think about it. It was an area of complexity. 
 From the point of view of trade and investment, we did 
not do badly on the whisky front, and Chávez issued a decree at 
one point which had the effect of putting Scotch whisky in the 
same category as essential medicines – a principle that should be 
much more widely adopted. Otherwise, it was a pretty difficult 
place from the investment point of view: clearly, our major 
investments were in the oil and, potentially, gas sector, and they 
fared pretty badly. People in the oil industry are a pretty 
pragmatic and flexible lot – they are used to working in difficult 
environments – but I recall vividly that, at my last meeting with 
them, they were very gloomy because it was exceptionally difficult 
to conduct business successfully and predictably, because of the 
way in which the politics intervened. 
 I was in Berlin when the Wall came down, so that is 
deeply part of my psyche, and many of the participants in 
Venezuelan politics saw the world in a way that I thought had 
changed in 1989, but they did not, so it was, economically, in 
terms of investment prospects, a bit of a throwback. You did ask 
me to look ahead, but it has not improved since I left. 
 
HOOPER I know Giles [Paxman] touched on the issues of trade and so on. 
 
BUTLER Both Giles and Peter [Collecott] said how much, during that time, 
FCO policy was to focus support and help on the big countries 
(Brazil and Mexico). In Costa Rica, it was very frustrating, 
because I had little help or chance of getting trade visits out there. 
At that moment, UK Trade and Investment decided that trade 
and investment support would be given to the two priority 
countries, and that was it. What we did in Costa Rica was just 
react to private industry and private enterprise when they came 
out. Jaguar41 arrived, which was terrific, and we helped them put 
on a show. We did the same when the BBC World42 came out. 
But it was always pretty frustrating because we did not have the 
resources to do a big presentation. 
 I think most of the countries of Central America have 
increasingly realised that they have the potential to be a great 
market. They have some 50 million people and they are 
increasing their economic growth by about 4 per cent on average 
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since 2008 has been owned by the Indian multinational company, Tata Motors. 
http://www.jaguar.co.uk/jaguar-range/index.html?gclid= 
CLLLzuzL5cMCFWOc2wodQh0AZQ [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
42 British Broadcasting Corporation World News. 
25 
 
every year. There was a wonderful conference last year, which I 
think you, Lady Hooper, were instrumental in setting up, at 
Lancaster House focused on Central American countries to 
underline what the opportunities are there.43 It is gradually 
becoming a place where the individual countries know they need 
to integrate in order to attract investment from overseas, in order 
to improve their infrastructure and in order to improve their 
financial and contract systems sufficiently to really be a market 
where people from the West want to put their money. 
 What has been most important over the years, particularly 
since I was there, is the negotiation of the Association Agreement 
with the EU, the Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA) and the knock-on relationship with the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) through the Dominican Republic and 
Belize. This is now linking all this area together and it has become 
a much more attractive place to do business. It is the sort of place 
now where we are going to get support, as we got support for 
setting up that particular conference last year. Through 
integration, I think these countries will, in the future, show that 
there is a great future for Central America. 
 
HOOPER To underline that, and it came up in the debate this morning, it 
was demonstrated by the conference last year that Georgina 
[Butler] referred to for business opportunities in Central America 
that, to increase the number of British exporters and investors 
overseas, we need to encourage small- and medium-size 
enterprises (SMEs) to start down the path. Being small 
companies, they very often need to have a lot of help and 
support, which is where our Embassies come in and are very 
valuable. In terms of Central America, since they are smaller 
countries and it looks less complicated to start off with, that is a 
very good starting point. 
 
PAXMAN Just one personal reflection: our exports to Mexico rose by 56 per 
cent in the period 1999-2008, when the crash came. Most of that, 
I am pleased to say, was during my period there. Despite that 
increase, we still represented, at the end of it, less than 1 per cent 
of the total of Mexican imports, and we were still being 
outperformed by Spain – obviously, because of historic links – as 
well as France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Why was 
that, particularly for a country that, at one point early after 
Mexican independence, accounted for about half of Mexican 
imports? What I found was that it was just very difficult to get 
British companies to focus on going that far away from home. I 
do not know whether it is still the same now, but companies were 
worried about their competitive position at home. They were 
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worried about protecting and developing what markets they 
might have in Europe, because most first exporters tend to go 
towards continental Europe. They worried about China and 
India, and whether they were missing out on the huge prospects 
there. Mexico was just too far down the line. 
 When it did come over the horizon and we were able to 
get to companies and say to them, ‘Come out and have a look’, 
we found that, almost invariably, they realised that there were 
terrific opportunities. Some came from Mexico itself as a rapidly 
developing country, and some came from the links up to the US 
through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
This created all sorts of opportunities for trade into Mexico. But 
there was a mental block that you had to get over to get 
companies – and particularly SMEs [Small and Medium 
Enterprises] – thinking beyond: ‘We have our UK market. We are 
trying to develop in Europe. We worry about China and India. 
Can we really take on more at the moment?’ 
 
HOOPER As I said at the outset, there is so much goodwill in Latin 
American countries for the British, and we ought to build on that, 
instead of competing in China, where the whole of the rest of the 
world is seeking to improve its markets. 
 
COLLECOTT The situation in Brazil was very similar to the one that Giles has 
described for Mexico. I think there is a slight difference between 
trade and investment. On the trade side, there were a number of 
large British companies that were doing pretty well, but they were 
big and did not need much help from us. Some of them have 
been there for 100 or 150 years and are very well-established. 
They have brands, they manufacture locally, and nobody knows 
any longer that they are British, which is great, as long as the 
profits keep flowing back. On the trade side, that seems to go 
pretty well. As in Mexico, where we plough along and try to help 
and encourage SMEs, but did not get that much success out of it, 
the story is very similar in Brazil. British exports have increased 
but they are still a pitifully small amount of a huge market. 
 On the investment side, it is a slightly different story, 
because there are some very large investments. BG44 is the largest 
foreign investor in Brazil, because of its investment of something 
like $20 billion up to 2020 in the offshore oilfields. There are 
other significant investors; for instance, Shell,45 with $5 billion 
going into biofuels in conjunction with a Brazilian company. The 
big guys, then, are doing it and know that they have to be 
invested in this huge market. There are a lot of other major 
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British companies and potential investors who know that, in the 
long run, ignoring the ups and downs of the Brazilian economy – 
and they are going through a down at the moment; when I was 
there, they were going through a huge up – they have to be 
invested more in Brazil as it becomes more important in the 
global economy. 
 There is, however, the same kind of hesitation and, ‘Not 
yet. Maybe there are better opportunities to invest in China and 
India. Maybe it is a bit difficult. We do not understand the 
language.’ They are, however, wrong, because, as a place to do 
business, while Brazil may be frustrating, it is nowhere near as 
complicated, frustrating or difficult as either China or India. The 
experiences of those who do business are good, whereas the 
experience of many in China and India is not. It is a learning 
process that they will have to go through. In terms of receptivity, 
Brazilians are an outgrowth of Europe, in large part. They are 
more comfortable dealing with Europeans than with Americans, 
and are not culturally completely different in the same way that 
the Chinese and Indians are, which makes doing business quite 
complicated at times. The potential is there but I am not sure that 
we are exploiting it as much as we should do. 
 
HOOPER Moving from the economic side to the political side, I think we 
all rejoice in the fact that twelve countries in Latin America had 
elections last year and successfully re-established a democratic 
system each time. That is wonderful. If the panel wishes to 
comment on the general point of political stability and how 
democracy is working in Latin America, that would be welcome, 
but there is one particular fly in the ointment in terms of the 
relations between this country and Latin America, which is, of 
course, the Falkland Islands. Since we have two former governors 
here with us, perhaps this is the moment to have some comments 
on that particular issue. Please remember – I feel a bit like Any 
Questions?46– to have your questions ready for when we open up 
to the floor for a wider dialogue. Shall we start with Nigel 
[Haywood]? 
 
HAYWOOD My starting point is that it should not be a fly in the ointment or a 
pebble in the shoe, or whatever metaphor you would like to 
choose. From William Hague’s Canning Speech – the 2010 
version47 – I think engagement with Latin America became very 
clear and became very welcomed, including in the Falkland 
Islands. Up until that point, there had been solid cross-party 
support for the Falkland Islanders, and the islanders themselves 
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saw that as a good thing. When I got there, however, there was a 
degree of disillusionment about. The idea was that Britain would 
not say anything internationally on the Falkland Islands, in case it 
created difficulties with Latin America. 
 What the islanders would have argued was that having 
good embassy relations with Latin America gave you a forum for 
putting the case of the Falkland Islanders, because what was clear 
was we had not been saying much, for whatever reason, and there 
was an information space that was filled with whatever particular 
argument the Kirchners48 decided to put out there. Not only, 
therefore, was there the usual lack of understanding about the 
Falkland Islands, because not many people have been there, but 
there was also a huge amount of misconception. 
 It seemed to us on the islands that we needed to do two 
things: the first one – and I am trying not to use the word 
‘paradox’ in every sentence, but some of these are paradoxical – 
was really to counter the propaganda war that the Kirchners had 
begun. The second one was to build a longer-term view of the 
Islands and also South Georgia, which is part of the Governor’s 
responsibilities, as not a source of friction between Britain and 
Latin America or anybody, but as something very special and 
important in its own right. We have talked about climate change 
and environmental change in connection with Latin American 
countries, but these are absolutely vital issues in the South 
Atlantic islands. Part of the longer-term vision is that these 
islands should be seen as a place for research and science, and as 
a place that is important, with a future, in their own right.49 
 There was a degree of unease about amongst 
Ambassadorial colleagues in Latin America at the task that they 
might have to go into Chanceries and make the case for the 
Falkland Islands. Of course, it is difficult. It is alright for 
Argentina: you go in, bang on a door and say, ‘I am here to tell 
you it is iniquitous that the British are in the Falkland Islands.’ It 
is more difficult to knock on a door and say, ‘Hello, I am here to 
tell you the Falkland Islands are a British Overseas Territory, and 
that is good.’ That is not a story, so what do you do? What we did 
was run, from the Islands, a very large-scale public diplomacy 
campaign of bringing journalists and politicians to the Islands, 
where their Governments would allow them to travel. We got 
them to see for themselves and, similarly, we sent islanders 
around Latin America. 
 Two things emerged from this: first, as Ambassadors had 
to go in and talk about the Falkland Islands with their Foreign 
Ministries, it did not have an effect on trade relations, as far as 
anybody could see. It did not have an effect on defence relations. 
All those countries had relations with Britain because it was 
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important to do so. You can compartmentalise an area of 
disagreement and move on with the main thrust of things. 
 Another thing was also clear. We had a wonderful couple 
of journalists from Uruguay who came down and did a glorious 
colour spread on the Falkland Islands and how British it was. 
Rather misguidedly, they headed it ‘The Falkland Islands’, which 
meant that they very quickly got a visit from the Argentine 
Embassy. The information started to get out there, however, and 
it grew. There are now a number of links between the Islands and 
Latin America which have sprung up as a result of these 
campaigns. Of course, the referendum gave us a very good 
excuse to go and knock on people’s doors and say, ‘Hello, there 
has been a referendum. This is the result.’50  
 You may wonder why we ever had a referendum when 
the outcome was totally inevitable. It was a Foreign Secretary of a 
very large and important country who said to us, ‘How do you 
know the Falkland Islanders want to remain British?’ and we felt 
that, if this is the level of lack of understanding out there, we 
really have to do something about it. 
 I am afraid that the Argentine position thrives on 
ignorance elsewhere in the world, and the one thing we have had 
to do is put it right. My contention is that the Islands are so 
important, with such an important future, that they should not be 
an inconvenience or a fly in the ointment, but they should be part 
of a broad relationship themselves with the continent of South 
America and part of British-Latin American relations, as a 
positive. That is a big ask, as they say in cricket. 
 
HOOPER Thank you very much. We do have the pleasure of the company 
of the Ambassador of Uruguay.51 I will not ask him to comment 
instantly but, if he wishes to make any remarks, he will be most 
welcome. Donald [Lamont] is another former Governor of the 
Falklands, but in a slightly different era. 
 
LAMONT Seasoned Latin American hands might be disposed to chide me 
by reminding me that Guido di Tella52 was a most unique Foreign 
Minister of Argentina, and I must not overestimate the prospect 
of what he achieved being in some way repeated. What he did 
achieve, however, shows that a more harmonious relationship is, 
indeed, possible. Guido di Tella worked, as I said, for about 10 
years to establish confidence with the islanders and to try to 
understand their aspirations and their fears. It was a difficult task 
                                                 
50 Falkland Islands sovereignty referendum, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
21750909 [Accessed 16 June 2015]. 
51 Fernando López-Fabregat. 
52 See footnote 15. 
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but he achieved it. He applied a bit of pressure as well by getting 
the Chileans, at a certain point, to stop the LAN Chile53 flights to 
and from the Islands. 
 The product was, in July 1999, a hastily-put-together 
agreement between the UK and Argentina, to which Falkland 
Island Councillors were witnesses and which they signed, so they 
were very much engaged in the process. That agreement was a 
couple of months after I arrived and had been preceded by an oil 
agreement between the UK and Argentina. In about 1998, there 
was drilling to the north-west of the Falklands. I think six holes 
were drilled by companies from various parts of the world. It 
would have been possible for the Argentine oil company YPF54 
to participate, and they attempted to do so; unfortunately, they 
chose the wrong partner, to London’s dismay, and so they did not 
get a slice of that action. 
 That whole activity proceeded in a peaceable, non-
controversial manner. Following the 1999 agreement, a number 
of things happened. It meant that Argentines could visit the 
Falklands on an Argentine passport, which had not been possible 
before. LAN Chile flights were restored. All sorts of steps were 
taken to build confidence, using diplomatic parlance, and it 
worked pretty well. Among the other things, the Embassy in 
Buenos Aires and Government House in Stanley were reading off 
the same page in the hymn sheet, which has not been the case 
throughout history. 
 Guido di Tella in fact visited the Falkland Islands – not as 
Foreign Minister, which would have been a tad difficult for him – 
about a year after, he was no longer in office and he was well 
received. To my horror, he phoned me one morning to say that 
he had gone to a pub the previous evening. It was an alarming 
prospect but he had been treated, in fact, very civilly. He was 
given a sherry, he chatted to people and he left. Everyone knew 
exactly who he was. 
 One of the determinations of the islanders was that, if 
they were party to an agreement, they would fulfil it. They would 
not be found wanting. I used to be a real bore at Wilton Park – 
maybe I am being a real bore now – if ever I saw some young 
diplomat from the Embassy in Buenos Aires, I would pin him or 
her up against the wall and ask them if they knew about a 
particular episode in the dealings with the Falklands, and they did 
not. One of the remarkable things, however, was the islanders’ 
agreement to the construction of a permanent memorial to the 
Argentine dead. That was achieved – I will not go into all the 
detail – over about six months. It was an Argentine design, 
approved by the islanders and, after I had gone, it was put up. 
 I cannot think of any parallel in the world where the 
population of a territory that has been at the wrong end of an 
                                                 
53 LAN Airlines is based in Chile. http://www.lan.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
54 YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) is the Argentine state-owned oil and gas 
company. http://www.ypf.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
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invasion has erected a permanent memorial to the troops of the 
invading country which still maintains the claim and many of 
whose military say, ‘We are coming back.’ It was an extraordinary 
gesture and achievement. Sadly, after the Menem government55 – 
and after, of course, Guido di Tella was replaced – President 
Néstor Kirchner56 took a different view of the situation and it 
became much more difficult to implement that agreement to 
move forward. 
 Implementation then went a bit flat and we began to see 
that the cooperation envisaged in fisheries was not working as it 
should, which began an unravelling of all that had been very 
carefully built up over many years. I am no expert, frankly, on the 
current scene, but it looks pretty bleak in terms of that 
relationship. For anyone to persuade the elected representatives 
of the Falkland Islands people that they should now engage in 
good faith with Argentina is a pretty big ask. 
 
HOOPER Of course, on the issue of dialogue, I think the British 
Government response has always been, ‘We are very happy to 
have dialogue on the subject, provided representatives of the 
Falkland Island Government could be present’, and that has 
always been refused. Since you raised, Donald [Lamont], the 
name of our beloved Guido di Tella, I raised this at a meeting 
with Canciller Timerman,57 when I was with a Parliamentary 
Group in Argentina last year, and he said, ‘It did no good. It is 
ridiculous.’ 
 My point was, ‘If you carry on being so horrible to the 
people of the Falkland Islands – and we say it is for the people of 
the Falklands to decide on their future – they are not going to be 
very happy with you.’ He said, ‘It did not work when Guido di 
Tella tried his rapprochement’, but that was at a very different 
time, as I tried to point out to him. That was within very short 
living memory – 10 years – of people having foreign troops 
coming into their gardens and houses, and the shock and horror 
of that was still very much felt. It is a generational thing, and it 
needs more time, so they ought to try to be a bit nicer again, it 
seems to me. 
 
COLLECOTT I just wanted to comment on the effect of the Falkland situation 
on the diplomacy that the rest of us were trying to do in South 
America in particular. I just remember that those of us who were 
Ambassadors of the Southern Cone countries in South America 
used to meet just about annually with the Governor of the 
Falkland Islands – and I am sure they still do. The view from 
most of the Ambassadors was that the Falkland conflict was the 
                                                 
55 Argentine Government of Carlos Saúl Menem, 1989-99. 
56 See footnote 48. 
57 Héctor Timerman, Foreign Minister of Argentina, 2010-. 
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elephant in the room every time they talked to their 
corresponding Government; to others, it was, to put it crudely, a 
large pile of dung sitting in the room, which they would rather 
was not there. 
 For me, I have to say it was not like that at all. It was a 
slight smell in the nostrils which you sometimes noticed, but 
throughout my time the Brazilians were very adept at having a 
rather nice dual policy, one arm of which was to sign up, 
sometimes with good grace and sometimes not with good grace, 
to all the declarations that the Argentines insisted were made at 
every international meeting on the need for negotiations on 
sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. The Brazilians would do that. 
One has to say – in parentheses – that their relationships – both 
personal and political – with Argentina are never very warm or 
very strong, and it goes both ways. 
 At the same time as having that policy, however, they 
were perfectly prepared to have a private policy which was much 
more accommodating to the British on practical things: to allow 
diversionary flights of RAF planes to Brazilian airfields, and to 
allow Royal Navy ships to dock in Brazilian ports on their way to 
or from patrolling in the Southern Ocean or in the Falklands. 
During my time, I had only one clash of arms with the Brazilians 
over the Falklands, which was symptomatic too of the foreign 
policy-making machinery that they had, and the rather different 
nature of the foreign policy towards the rest of South America, 
which was dominated by two people – one the Deputy Foreign 
Minister58 and one the Foreign Affairs Advisor to the President59 
– who were somewhat more left-wing, radical and anti-imperialist 
and, therefore, slightly anti-British. 
 This passage of arms was the result of a visit that 
President Lula had made to Buenos Aires at the time of Mrs 
Kirchner, who waved at him some photographs of a British ship 
sailing out of Rio de Janeiro on its way to the Falklands and 
rejoicing at the good time that they had had in Rio and the fact 
that they were now going to go and patrol in southern waters. I 
was summoned and presented with these things, told that this 
was not acceptable, and asked what I was going to do about it. 
The person who presented them to me was one of these two 
characters, otherwise known in Brasilia as the alternative 
Ambassador of Argentina, even though he was the Secretary 
General of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry60 at the time. 
 Interestingly, we were able, by using channels that I had 
built up, to appeal over his head to the Foreign Minister61 and to 
use the lever of the bilateral relationship that we had built up 
assiduously over the previous three or four years, to say, ‘You do 
                                                 
58 Samuel Guimaraes, Deputy Foreign Minister of Brazil, 2003-9. 
59 Unconfirmed by the speaker but assumed to be referring to Marco Aurélio 
Garcia, Special Foreign Policy Advisor to Brazilian President, 2007-. 
60 Samuel Guimaraes, Deputy Foreign Minister of Brazil, 2003-9. 
61 Celso Amorim, Foreign Minister of Brazil, 1993-5 and 2003-11. 
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not really want to make a fuss about this. This has been going on 
quite quietly and you are quite happy for the practical cooperation 
to continue, not least because, were there to be oil exploration 
around the Falklands, you are hopeful that you will get some 
business for Brazilian ports and Brazilian companies there.’ In a 
sense, we won that. We pulled on the lever of bilateral relations 
and it proved strong enough to calm that down. 
 I think the situation has moved on since then, in a 
negative sense. We are now not allowed to have Royal Navy visits 
if those ships are going to or from the Falklands. I think that is 
still true, and it is a pity. It is a retrograde step from the Brazilians 
but I suspect that, in the long term, it is not immutable and there 
probably are, in the longer term, ways of trying to restore a 
somewhat more pragmatic attitude which is very Brazilian and 
very helpful. It is possible that there is a distinction between the 
public position and what happens in practice. 
 
HAYWOOD It is true that South American countries have, essentially, closed 
their ports to Royal Navy vessels going to or coming back from 
the Falkland Islands, although there is, of course, considerable 
interest in Royal Navy vessels, and particularly in the Type 45s.62 
Mysteriously, therefore, the bans do not exclude joint exercises at 
sea, where they catch up with vessels on the way up or down. 
There are many ways of getting around the practicalities of those 
questions, but it is true to say that Argentina is doing its level best 
to stop any form of cooperation along those lines. 
 
HOOPER I think the moment has arrived to open up for questions from the 
floor. There are a number of other issues that I would like to deal 
with but it is good to have a bit of audience participation. 
 
JACQUES ARNOLD What came across to me quite strongly is that, in this day and age, 
and perhaps going back 10 or 15 years, we seem to have lost a 
cadre of people inside the diplomatic service who have lifelong, 
in-depth experience of Latin America. Peter [Collecott] in 
particular hinted that his appointment was enhanced because he 
did not have that experience. Why is that the case? I would have 
thought that that was the very reverse of what we need. 
 
COLLECOTT It is really a very Brazilian thing. It was an advantage, if I can put 
it no more pejoratively than that, that I was not what a lot of 
other countries were seen by the Brazilians to have: a re-tread of 
an Ambassador who had started earlier in his career in Spanish-
                                                 
62 ‘Britain’s 6 Type 45 destroyers are the most advanced warships the nation has 
ever built.’ http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-equipment/ships/destroyers/type-
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speaking Latin America and eventually, towards the end of his 
career, had ended up in the biggest country in Latin America – 
namely, Brazil – speaking ‘Portugol’, as they used to say; in other 
words, Portuguese with Spanish inflections. They liked the fact 
that I was not that, that I had learned Portuguese in order to go 
there, and did not speak any Spanish at all, and that there was also 
some substance behind it. 
 Given the point at which I was appointed, and what we 
were talking about earlier, which was the way that, in particular, 
the Foreign Office and then Government more widely were 
interested in treating Brazil in particular, but also Mexico, as 
somewhat different and as an emerging power, and dealing with 
Brazil not as the largest country in Latin America or in South 
America but as an emerging power that was going to be one of 
the dozen most influential countries in the world, it was very 
advantageous to be able to present myself, therefore, as someone 
who was not seeing Brazil as part of Latin America but in a global 
perspective, and as somebody who had those different 
perspectives. 
 They responded extremely well to that; in other words, an 
interlocutor who they thought would not only be able to talk to 
them about Latin American issues from a deep knowledge of 
their and Latin American history, but who was treating them as a 
serious player on the world stage with something to say on the 
issues that that raised for them and for us. 
 
MILLS I am interested in relations between the United States and Great 
Britain in Latin America. Could anybody provide any more 
insight into how they felt British representation was viewed in 
Latin America or, indeed, in the Falkland Islands by the United 
States, and how relations were with American Ambassadors and 
diplomats in that country: how much cooperation and rivalry 
there was, or whether there was that contact? 
 
PAXMAN Mexico, as you know, has a very close and somewhat troubled 
relationship with the US, but the US does still take nearly 80 per 
cent of Mexican exports and provides well over 50 per cent of 
foreign direct investment coming into Mexico, so it is a 
relationship that has to be kept going. When I was there, my 
relationship with the US Ambassador was absolutely crucial. It 
helped me gain an understanding of what was going on in the 
Mexico-US bilateral relationship and the issues around the border 
relating to immigration and the Mexican drugs cartels arms 
purchases in the southern states of the US, which was a big bone 
of contention for the Mexicans. I had to have very close contact 
with the Americans; not just the Ambassador, but the agencies 
that were working there, and particularly the Drug Enforcement 




 There is no doubt that the Americans knew a lot more 
about what was going on Mexico-wide than we did, because they 
had much greater resources. The American Embassy is huge. 
They have big Consulates in Monterrey and a lot of places along 
the border, so they had a depth of understanding that we did not. 
Our direct access to the Mexican Government was very good and 
we could go and talk to just about anyone we wanted to about 
just about anything.  Nevertheless it was always useful to have the 
American angle on it, because, of course, they came at it from a 
different angle, and that provided us with more perspective. It 
was, then, a really close relationship. 
 
LAMONT I am reminded that, before I went out to Caracas in 1999, 
someone who knows Latin America – not from the Foreign 
Office but from the media – said, ‘You are not going to have 
much fun. You are going to be cold-shouldered because you will 
be seen as alongside the Americans, because of Iraq.’ That was 
untrue. For whatever reason, but including the fact that he had 
been invited twice to the UK, Chávez did not lump us together 
but treated us on our own merits. I would meet with the US 
Ambassador63 pretty frequently. We had very similar analyses of 
the situation and very different ways of how we thought we 
should deal with it. They are the great power; we are not. 
 As two Ambassadors, however, you are feeding off 
similar contacts and reading very similar intelligence reporting, so 
you have a lot in common. Because of the bad state of relations 
between the US and Venezuela at the time, however, one likes to 
think, he would get something from us. It was not just at 
ambassadorial level; it happened at all levels in the Embassy. We 
had contacts and discussions with Government that the 
Americans could not have, in areas, for example, like 
counternarcotics, where they benefited from speaking to us. 
 
BUTLER In Central America, it is crucial to keep in close contact with the 
American Ambassador, because 50 per cent of the trade is 
between Costa Rica and the United States. They have a great deal 
of influence over the Costa Ricans. In fact, Costa Rica, despite 
the fact that it is a pacific country with no military forces, initially 
signed up for the Coalition in the Iraq War in 2003. But this 
caused big debates in the National Assembly which eventually 
decided it was against the Costa Rican Constitution and the 
Government had to withdraw its support. 
 In both Costa Rica and Nicaragua, I kept in close touch 
with the Americans. The Ambassador in Costa Rica is a political 
                                                 




appointment and the appointment is regarded as a plum job. The 
first one I was close to was a friend of President Bush64 and he 
went on to be the Ambassador in Brazil: John Danilovich.65 He 
was very well plugged-in, so it was really useful to keep in touch 
with him and I got a lot of help from him. We reciprocated when 
we could through our own connections. 
 
COLLECOTT In Brazil, we had extraordinarily close and friendly contacts with 
both US Ambassadors during my time. I am tempted to say I 
think we were influenced slightly by the fact that, as in Central 
America, the two American Ambassadors66 who I coincided with 
were both political appointees and were both, therefore, 
concentrating pretty much on the commercial side rather than 
being too involved on the political and strategic side. They were 
succeeded, just after my time, by a career diplomat,67 who 
probably had a slightly different attitude and, therefore, a slightly 
different relationship. However, the relations were very friendly, 
although not fantastically substantive. 
 
HAYWOOD Our relations with America over the Falklands are interesting in 
that they view their position as one of studied neutrality. Our job 
is really to convince them that their neutral position is anything 
other than neutral, for the simple reason that, if you call for 
negotiations or discussions now, you are not sitting around a 
table with Guido di Tella talking about sending Pingu68 tapes and 
how wonderful it is to build up warm relations. You are talking 
about when you are going to hand over the Falkland Islands to 
Argentina, because that is what negotiations mean to them. They 
changed their Constitution so that that can be the only thing that 
they mean, which is why we devoted a lot of time to getting 
Congressional visits, where we could. We had two Congressional 
visits. I called on the State Department. We have an Ambassador 
in Washington69 who is extremely clued-up on the Falkland 
Islands, so our relationship, politically, is one of trying to get the 
Americans to understand that having Hillary Clinton70 call for 
dialogue is not a neutral position. 
 Meanwhile, as the world revolves, we have an American 
company engaged in oil exploration in the Falkland Islands, 
which means that they are now starting to have an economic dog 
in the fight and it will be interesting to see how that pans out in 
the long run. 
                                                 
64 George W. Bush, President of United States, 2001-9. 
65 John Danilovich, US Ambassador to Costa Rica, 2001-4; to Brazil, 2004-5. 
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1986 and 2000. 
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HOOPER There are, of course, other external powers with interests in Latin 
America; namely, China and the EU, of which we are part. It may 




I find it rather pleasing that Guido di Tella’s name was mentioned 
in such a positive light in this context, but it was not always like 
this. Guido di Tella was very often misunderstood both here and 
certainly always in Argentina. I remember his unceasing efforts 
throughout his decade at the head of the Argentine Foreign 
Ministry to get the Foreign Office to agree to talk, and I 
remember telling the Foreign Office, ‘This is the most Anglophile 
Argentine Foreign Minister you will ever have. This is the time to 
get things going and to get things really rolling.’ The July 1999 
agreement came too late (there was a change of government at 
the end of the year). Guido di Tella understood dialogue as that: 
‘Let us talk. Let us see what comes out of it.’ He knew he had to 
build the trust of the islanders after what had happened following 
the invasion in 1982, but he understood what dialogue was. 
 Gloria [Hooper]’s comment about Timerman’s comment 
– ‘Guido Di Tella achieved nothing’ – is very telling, because, in 
terms of what Timerman was saying – and this is what the 
Kirchner administration was saying, which is why Néstor 
Kirchner abandoned the oil conversations that were going on – 
he did not really achieve anything. For them to achieve anything 
was to have a date for the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to 
Argentina. When the Kirchner administration talk about dialogue 
and negotiations, it is only about fixing a chronogram for the 
handing over of the islands. That is why, for them, Guido di Tella 
had not achieved anything. Because establishing friendly links 
with the inhabitants of the Islands in an effort at confidence-
building counted as ‘nothing’ because the Islands were not 
handed over. This is why, currently, every time Mrs Kirchner 
goes to the United Nations, or her representative in residence just 
at the other side of Belgrave Square71 from where we are has the 
opportunity, they say, ‘What is wrong with dialogue? Why is the 
UK opposed to dialogue?’ It is because the British government 
understand that what the current Argentine government mean by 
‘dialogue’, is not really a dialogue but an agreement on the date to 




I am studying Diplomatic Studies at Oxford University and I 
have a quick comment. It seems to me that there is a stress from 
the UK to improve trade and investment rather than cooperation 
and aid in the last couple of years. Because of that, there has not 
been too much aid received from the UK in comparison to 
                                                 
71 The Argentine Ambassador’s Residence is 49 Belgrave Square, London. Canning 
House is located at 8 Belgrave Square. 
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regions such as Africa or Asia. If this is the case, why is there that 
shift? If there is still some cooperation, in what areas would that 
be? 
 
PAXMAN As you probably know, there was a big shift in policy on overseas 
development during 2003-05, to focus our spending on the 
poorest countries. At that point, a lot of other countries fell out 
of the UK aid programme. We never had much of an aid 
programme in Mexico, which is a more developed country. The 
reason why the focus was so much on Africa and some Asian 
countries was that these were the poorest countries, and it was 
felt that this was where our money could have the biggest impact. 
 It is not necessarily right, however, to think purely in 
terms of financial transfers. What we were doing a lot of – 
certainly in Mexico and, I think, in a lot of the other countries in 
Latin America – was transfer of best practice and knowledge. We 
are working a lot on issues around justice, governance and the 
principles of sustainable development, which, hopefully, are 
helping countries to become self-sufficient and prosperous. 
 In a way, I would argue that the fact that the amount of 
British pure aid, in financial terms, going to Latin America 
dropped is a good sign. It is a sign that those countries have 
reached a stage in their political and economic development 
where they have become stable countries where governance has 
improved and where you can work through dialogue, through 
assistance and through transfer of technology, knowledge, 
experience and best practice, rather than simply through financial 
tools. 
 
COLLECOTT Just to add to that, the story in Brazil is very similar to the one in 
Mexico that Giles [Paxman] has described. At about the same 
time, the DFID programme, such as it had been up until 2003-04, 
was reduced, and we did some very similar things to that which 
Giles has described in Mexico. 
 The other added element which was very interesting and 
quite important was that there began to be so-called ‘triangular’ 
cooperation; in other words, DFID, the British Council and 
others started cooperating with the Brazilians in efforts to 
provide aid or technical assistance to various African countries, 
which was very consonant with the kind of Africa policy which 
Brazil had under President Lula. That was, in a number of 
instances, extremely successful, and it is probably continuing 
now. 
 Part of it was helping to transfer Brazilian expertise in 
things like conditional cash transfers to various African countries: 
some transfers of technologies – both agricultural and industrial – 
around issues like biofuels; transferring knowledge and 
experience gained with the rather successful vaccination and 
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inoculation programmes that the Brazilians had to African 
countries; and their very successful programme of AIDS72 
treatments to suffering African countries. I think that added – 
and I am sure it has developed since; I am not aware of the 
details – a different dimension to what it did. As Giles [Paxman] 
was implying, that kind of cooperation does not cost very much 
in money transfer. 
 
LAMONT I will say a word about Uruguay and a word about Venezuela. 
Before I arrived in Montevideo, London shifted its policy and 
was going to be engaged in an aid programme in every country in 
Latin America. The problem in Uruguay was that, while we had a 
formal agreement, which was good, the amount of money 
available was pretty limited, and the support and engagement of 
British expertise was such that, I have to say, my Deputy and I 
concluded that this was actually damaging to the bilateral 
relationship rather than positive for it. 
 In Venezuela, where there was no British aid programme, 
we were doing stuff that has been alluded to. We were 
beneficiaries, if you like, of an experiment that Robin Cook73 
launched to have human rights experts in different Embassies 
around the world, and we had one in Caracas. That meant that we 
were able to put on programmes about human rights. Human 
rights and the police was an area of emphasis, as were areas of 
good government, which had potential impact and benefit. We 
even got a team of British Special Forces to help train the 
counter-narcotics folk in Venezuela. We did these things, then, 
not aid, and I think they helped more than aid would have. 
 
BUTLER I have already told you that the Central American DFID office in 
Managua was closed down, and thereafter aid money was not 
allocated by country. As the others have said, developmental 
support is now delivered in a more sophisticated way – by 
themes. So we assist in areas that we are good at, for example 
expertise in the fields of human rights or biodiversity. In Costa 
Rica, we sent out police experts on child abuse etc. One of the 
areas where we did really well was with our Chevening74 
scholarships. I was pretty cheesed off with the numbers that were 
given to Brazil and Mexico because, particularly in my time, yet 
again we were thrown the crumbs, and the big boys got the big 
numbers! But even with the small number of scholarships we 
                                                 
72 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. 
73 Robin Cook (1946-2005), Foreign Secretary, 1997-2001. 
74 ‘Chevening Scholarships are the UK government’s global scholarship programme, 
funded by the Foreign Office and partner organisations. The programme makes 
awards to outstanding scholars with leadership potential from around the world to 




were allocated, we were very successful in choosing some 
wonderful young men and women – I wonder whether the young 




I was a Chevening scholar. 
 
BUTLER We chose some remarkable young men who have risen to 
become presidents, heads of political parties and senior members 
in economic ministries, who were Chevening scholars. I really 
think this is part of our aid programme that should be expanded. 
 
PAXMAN Very briefly, I should have mentioned that it is important also to 
realise that there are quite large amounts of UK aid going to Latin 
America through the EU. In many ways, it can make sense to 
deliver your aid through the EU, if you can get the right sort of 
coordination, programmes, monitoring and evaluation. 
 
COLLECOTT As well as through the World Bank75 and the IMF76. 
 
BUTLER Yes, I should have stressed straightaway the significant amounts 
of aid we deliver through the EU. In fact, the EU in Central 
America has been instrumental in pushing forward the regional 
integration agenda which is so important for the future 
development of the region. I think the Central America-EU 
Association Agreement77 is the EU’s first inter-regional 
association agreement, which has now been signed and is 
operational since 2013.The aid in this area has been very valuable. 
 
HOOPER I was going to make the point about EU funding, but I would 
also like to emphasise that we are one of the few countries in the 
world that hits the 0.7 per cent target for overseas aid. I think, in 
fact, because Latin American countries are judged to be middle-
income countries, you should take that as a compliment, because 
it shows that the direct funding is going only to the poorest of the 
poor countries, which, at the moment, seem to be largely in 
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 Could people who are students or here for study purposes 
put up their hands so that we can have an idea? 




I am a Latin American Studies Masters student at Oxford. I am 
afraid I have quite an unfashionable question for you but, as 
veterans of British diplomacy, I feel like I should seize my 
opportunity. Dare I say, as a young person such as myself 
potentially interested in a career in the Foreign Service, what 
advice would you proffer? 
 
COLLECOTT It is a question that quite a number of people of your age, or 
perhaps a little younger, have asked me – friends, relatives etc. I 
always say think about it carefully, but there are fantastic 
advantages if you decide that that is the kind of life that you want 
to live. There are disadvantages to that life as well: you live your 
life in little boxes of three or four years, moving around the 
world, and you have to be able to cope with that. I would also say 
to them talk to people who do it to see if that is the kind of area, 
transactional diplomacy, that you would like to be involved in, 
because it is very different doing that. 
 I think we are all here probably because we like doing it. 
We like that kind of transactional stuff and we like dealing with 
people and the intellectual stimulus that goes with it, because you 
are dealing with intelligent people and dealing with issues that are 
mostly both interesting and important. Some people like that and 
others do not. Some people would rather keep their academic 
distance and be able to become an expert in a particular region. It 
is slightly horses for courses, but, I would finally say, if you decide 
that you can pass those hurdles, do it and you most certainly will 
not regret it. 
 
PAXMAN I agree with Peter [Collecott]. I think that there is no greater 
privilege than being sent abroad to represent your country. There 
is also nothing more enjoyable, as far as I am concerned, than 
going to another country with a remit to find out what makes that 
country tick and who the key people are who pull the levers and 
who can deliver things that you want for your country. It is 
absolutely fascinating. It is a hugely varied career. In my career, I 
have dealt with the former Soviet Union and with Europe; I have 
done trade work; and I have been involved in consular work in 
Spain. It is massively varied. It is hugely intellectually challenging 
and there are some really great people. That is the upside. 
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 In terms of the downside, the pay is pretty bad. The 
Ferrero Rocher lifestyle,78 if it ever existed, certainly does not 
exist anymore now. Diplomats do not get up in the morning 
thinking, ‘Great, I am going to a cocktail party tonight.’ Quite the 
contrary – the receptions that you go to are very much tools of 
the trade. You go in and spot who you want to talk to, do your 
business and get out. Otherwise, you do not have a life at all. And 
it does put enormous strains on individuals, as Peter [Collecott] 
said, having to change every three or four years to a different job 
in a different country. You go to your first event, look around the 
room, know absolutely nobody there and think, ‘Here we go. I 
have to start all over again, building up the contacts, the networks 
and the influence.’ 
 The job can be particularly demanding, I think, on 
families in terms of what you do about children’s education and 
the like. I have seen, so many times, couples where one half 
clearly wants to be going around the world and finding out what 
makes countries tick, and the other would probably rather be at 
home with friends and family or looking after aged relatives, not 
sitting at home supporting a diplomatic spouse. If you are in a 
relationship, you need to be able to take these sorts of decisions 
as a couple, rather than as an individual. 
 
HAYWOOD Gather information and be very clear about what you are going in 
for, as Giles [Paxman] said. You really do have to be able to 
operate as a team when you are abroad. It is unfashionable. You 
are not marked on it; in fact, you cannot be, because you cannot 
expect a spouse to operate. If you have a spouse with you, you 
are on show, and your spouse is on show, all round the clock, all 
the time you are there. You have to be comfortable with being in 
that sort of goldfish bowl. 
 Upsides are considerable, in that you have an unparalleled 
opportunity to form your own specialism, really, to get engaged in 
the country that you are in or going to, and to find out how it 
works. It is great, and you have unparalleled access to everything 
and everybody when you are there, not just as an Ambassador but 
even from being First Secretary onwards. You have total 
opportunity to enjoy yourself. 
 You enter in a group of about 20 or so, and everybody is 
interested in different things. If everybody wanted to go to Paris 
and Washington, there would be a lot of very unhappy and 
disappointed people around. They do not. You can form your 
own specialisation quite happily. I was probably the Foreign 
Office’s foremost Finno-Ugric specialist, largely by default, but it 
fascinated me, because I was a comparative philologist at 
university, so I was able, eventually, to spend two years learning 
                                                 
78 Referring to an advertisement for Ferrero Rocher, a chocolate and nut sweet, ‘At 
the Ambassador’s Reception.’ See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4P-
nZZkQqTc [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
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Hungarian and then Estonian. The Office will support you. 
Before going to the Falklands, I had a year to do an MSc in 
Environmental Biology and Conservation Biology, because it was 
important for the job. You will, then, get the support and the 
training to do these things. 
 Within that, I should say it is not like people used to 
characterise it, as in you go where you are sent. Technically, you 
are obliged to go where you are sent, but you have huge control 
over how your career is shaped. You are the person who shapes 
your career. You have to compete against people for jobs within 
it, but you can shape that career. If you want fame and riches, it is 
probably the wrong job because, if you get them, you probably 
should be in prison, but it is just enormous fun. 
 
BUTLER Of course, I agree with what they have said so far. It is an 
enormous privilege and you have enormous fun. It is, though, 
quite difficult for a woman. I do not know whether you can really 
be a good diplomat, a good wife and a good mother. Something 
in those three has to give. Things have got much better for 
women. When I got married to another member of the Service, I 
had to resign – married women diplomats were not accepted in 
the fast stream in those days. The rules only changed in 1972. 
After that the Office introduced ‘special unpaid leave’ so that, 
when they posted one of you, the other one could go on leave. 
Of course, in the sort of era I am talking about, it seemed to me 
as a woman, if you were going to have children, why mess up two 
careers? He, then, would have first choice and I would come 
along afterwards. 
 Those sorts of problems have been sorted out these days, 
and the Foreign Office is much more accommodating to women 
in terms of trying to keep them on their books. They also have 
many more married couples within the Service these days, so it is 
possible. But women should think very hard about it as a career, 
however, because, on personal relationships, it is very hard. 
 
LAMONT On the personal front, I am reminded that, when I arrived in 
Moscow in 1980, aged 33, the wife of the Ambassador,79 asked 
me, ‘Mr Lamont, what is a man of your age doing not being 
married then?’ Some months later I had a fiancée and she asked, 
‘Mr Lamont, what do you have to say for yourself today?’ I said, 
‘I have found someone who can put up with the life.’ She is still 
my wife – I had better add that – and she has put up with the life 
and with me. 
 Why I joined the service, I suppose, boils down to variety. 
I was in the motor industry and I saw a kind of sameness; in the 
Diplomatic Service, I saw variety. Moscow commercial work; the 
                                                 
79 Margaret, Lady Keeble (1924-2014), wife of Sir Curtis Keeble, British 
ambassador to Moscow, 1976-82. 
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Falklands Governor at a time of good relations with Argentina; 
dealing with Hugo Chávez; being in Berlin when the Wall came 
down and responding to that, etc. There was tremendous variety 
there. 
 On a personal level, being driven by a Royal Marine 
around icebergs in South Georgia, up the river that is a branch of 
the Orinoco in a canoe driven by someone else who was not a 
Royal Marine, flying in a helicopter around the Berlin Wall when 
it was still there – all of these things were great fun and exciting. 
But also the feeling that you are, without being too pompous, 
doing an important job. 
 
HOOPER My only additional comment would be that the pay may not be 
very good, but very often the Residence is rather nice. After my 
fellowship year, when I was travelling around Latin America as a 
poor student, I would have given my eye teeth to be invited by 
the Ambassador to stay in the Residence. Now that I am old and 
capable of financing myself in a hotel, I am always invited by the 
Ambassador, so that is a bit perverse. Thank you for that 




I am a Professor of Latin American History at Oxford. I was 
struck by all those answers, until the very last sentence, that they 
seemed to be rather self-referential about how this is interesting, 
you go to interesting countries, you meet interesting people, you 
go up trips up the Orinoco – fine. I am not sure that is a good 
answer to someone who might be entering the diplomatic service, 
until the very last sentence, although it was a slightly throwaway 
line, where you said you made a difference. Listening to all the 
discussions, which have been very interesting, I am left slightly in 
doubt as to where you did make a difference. 
 I admit, as a historian, I have spent a lot of time reading 
lots of ambassadorial and other reports going back 150 years, and 
there is no question that, over 100 years, British Ambassadors 
had a lot of influence and leverage in Latin America, which they 
often used for the wrong reason but they had that. My sense from 
your descriptions of what you have done is that, while I am not 
saying that we should not have Ambassadors or Embassies, there 
are arguments about how much the hardworking British taxpayer 
should spend and whether Embassies should be expanded or 
closed. I am entirely supportive of initiatives such as Chevening. 
 If you take the economic front in particular, however, 
which, in Latin America, is by far the most important – the 
strategic interest, aside from perhaps the Falklands, is not very big 
– as Giles Paxman said, our British trade performance in Latin 
America over the past 50 years has been very bad. That is not 
your fault, but probably the fault of those would-be exporters 
that do not export or do not produce the right widgets to export. 
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I am left wondering: what is the value-added? Nobody said, ‘Here 
was something I did that was really useful and beneficial.’ Perhaps 
you are too modest to blow your own horn like that. I got some 
generalities – Chevening was mentioned etc. – but I am still left a 
little in the dark about the role of a British Ambassador in Latin 
America today. 
 
COLLECOTT I am not quite sure which end to start at. The first point is 
something that we did say at the beginning, which is that, 
fundamentally, there was not – and has not been for a long time – 
a British policy or strategy towards Latin America. I think that 
that has probably become somewhat less the case, but I am not 
sure that it has been reversed, having seen the recent papers on 
Latin America. The point about that, however, is that the people 
who have an overview of what the country is, how the country 
works, and how we can best, as the UK, try to influence that 
country and work with that country, is not somebody sitting here 
in London. The only people who have the overview of that are 
the people sitting there and, in particular, the Ambassador. 
 I saw it as my responsibility – and I am sure my colleagues 
did – to define for Whitehall, and try to convince them, where we 
should be going with a particular country. In my case, it was 
Brazil, at a time when we needed to define how we were going to 
interact with and try to influence that country as, as I said earlier, 
it became more important and began to integrate itself into the 
fora of global governance. I think that is precisely what we did, 
and the instruments of that were the usual ones. 
 I wrote the policy paper on what our future policy 
towards Brazil should be over the next few years in the lead-up to 
a Lula State Visit here, and it ended up being endorsed across 
Government, including by Tony Blair80 as the Prime Minister. I 
was probably the only person who could do that, and I used to be 
the one who came back and would chair Whitehall committees, 
or committees of people from all the Whitehall departments who 
were engaged in Brazil, to try to make sure that there was a 
coherence to what we were doing, and I am sure Giles [Paxman] 
did the same with Mexico. That is fundamentally what we did. 
 If you want an instance of something which might be 
slightly more useful in the short term, I said earlier that the 
subject that took up more of my time than anything else was 
climate change. We spent a lot of money doing that and I spent a 
lot of effort doing that, but what we managed to do was, in the 
run-up to the December 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the 
Parties (COP), we did manage to change the Brazilian position 
and Brazilian attitudes. 
 That is what we had intended to do in the three years 
prior to that, and we did that by a number of things: by 
                                                 
80 Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 1997-2007. 
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traditional diplomacy – in other words, talking to people; in 
particular, drip-feeding to Brazilian ministers, both by myself and 
by visiting British Ministers, why it was in their interests that 
something needed to be done, why it was in their interests to 
ensure that the Amazon was not destroyed anymore, and why 
they could feel comfortable with any climate change agreement 
on targets which came out. By reducing deforestation in the 
Amazon, they could meet any reduction target for decreased 
emissions that was ever likely to be agreed, because 75 per cent of 
their emissions were from that. They were very large and they 
have reduced them. 
 It was partly through that kind of classical diplomacy – 
talking and persuading people, including at the top. It was also 
partly by getting together all the senior Brazilian climate, 
agricultural and water specialists, scientists and, with some 
funding from the British Government, getting them, over a 
period of about 18 months, to write the equivalent of a Stern 
Report81 on the economics of climate change in Brazil. That is 
what we did. The Foreign Ministry did not like it. They thought 
we were trying to influence opinion and to change their minds, 
which we were, but eventually they had to come on-board 
because all the Brazilian experts were engaged in this and thought 
it was worth doing. 
 The result, as I said, was that, in the run-up to 
Copenhagen, the official Brazilian negotiators wished to maintain 
a rather tough position on the adoption of targets but were 
overruled by their Minister. He said, ‘The penny has dropped. I 
have understood that agriculture in Brazil, Uruguay and 
Argentina is dependent on rainfall, which is generated in the 
Amazon. Without it, we would lose 60-70 per cent of our rainfall. 
We would not have agriculture, and that would screw our 
economy. I understand this and we are going to be much more 
accommodating.’ We were not the only ones doing this kind of 
stuff but we had significant influence, I believe, on that change of 
position. In a sense, I am banging my own drum, but that is what 
we did. That is the kind of thing that we do, but we probably do 
not tell the world that we are doing it. 
 
PAXMAN I agree with all of that, but I think Alan has a point. One of the 
difficulties of a diplomatic career is that, on the really big issues, 
you very rarely see the beginning, the middle and the end. It is 
very rarely the same person who has the idea, who does all the 
legwork and preparation, who negotiates the deal and who sees 
the final outcome. So it is often difficult to measure an 
individual’s contribution to a major success. 
                                                 
81 The Economist Sir Nicholas Stern produced a Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change on 30 Oct. 2006. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+ /http: 




 Second, we work as teams. An individual Ambassador 
working alone can achieve a certain amount, and you get 
wonderful kicks when you do. If you go in and manage to 
persuade your host government to support a British position at 
the UN or if you go and talk to a Minister and say, ‘This British 
Company is having a lot of difficulties in this particular area. 
Would you agree to see them and talk to them to see if you can 
see a way around the problem?’ In the Consular area, you can 
often achieve things through your individual efforts, and so too in 
multilateral diplomacy, if you are negotiating a particular piece of 
legislation in Brussels, for example. If you can see the negotiation 
through to an end when you have defined your objectives and 
your strategy, you have built your alliances, you have your points 
out on the table, you have won the arguments, you have the right 
wording at the end of it. For a lot of what an Ambassador does, 
however, the aims are long term and strategic, have to be tackled 
by teamwork and outlive the individual. 
 Relationships between countries tend to be fairly glacial 
and, when they change, they change often because of outside 
events. I said that, during my period in Mexico, our exports to 
Mexico increased by probably 35 per cent. I am not sure how 
much of the credit I can take for that. I was simply leading a 
team. In any case, one of the big problems that you find with 
dealing with trade is that so much depends on factors that you 
cannot influence such as exchange-rate movements. If the 
exchange rate moves in the right sort of way, your exports start to 
go up and you are quids in. There is, then, a big difficulty in terms 
of measuring how you achieve and what you achieve. Quite 
often, you can set out with specific objectives and not achieve 
them, but achieve something else that is equally worthwhile. 
 I had the same sort of experience as Peter [Collecott] 
dealing with climate change. One of my key objectives was to get 
Mexico into a position where they were acting as a sort of bridge 
between the developed and the developing world on climate 
change, because Mexico, after we had talked to them for an 
awfully long time, got it. They did understand the issue and they 
were prepared, because they had a vested interest – and we were 
able to persuade them that they did have a vested interest – to 
become protagonists in the negotiations, for example by 
organising meetings in Monterrey, proposing themselves for the 
Cancún COP82 etc. I do not think that that would have happened 
without our effort in country. My effort contributed but I had a 
strong and hard-working team. We had people in London. We 
had Ministers working on this and all sorts of other people. So, 
Alan, you do have a point, and it is quite difficult in our business 
to measure with any degree of accuracy what you have achieved. 
 
                                                 
82 Cancún Climate Change Conference, Nov. 2010. http://unfccc.int/meetings/ 
cancun_nov_2010/ meeting/6266.php [Accessed 27 May 2015]. 
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HOOPER It is the issue of soft power: you cannot define it or quantify it 
very easily. 
 
BUTLER Overseas we have to draft business plans every year, which tie 
what you do in with what the Foreign Office wants to do, so it is 
much more structured than it used to be. You choose from the 
list of FCO priorities areas where you think you can make a 
difference in the country where you are accredited. In Costa Rica, 
it was on the human rights side. I suppose the project I am most 
proud of is in the Supreme Court: as part of a project funded by 
the Embassy the Court now has a video-evidence room which 
records a child giving evidence about child abuse which can be 
used in Court. There is a second room where the police and 
judges can be trained in how to interview children on such a 
difficult and sensitive subject. 
 When I arrived in Costa Rica, they would not even talk 
about sex tourism, which was clearly a big issue, and I made it 
one of the things that I worked hard on. In the end, there are 
now five different places around the country where they can take 
evidence and where people are now trained. They have a little 
plaque up – and they gave me a little plaque too – for the work I 
did on this. As Giles [Paxman] said, though, you are part of a 
team and you cannot do that sort of thing on your own. Good 
projects take time. Usually, you do not see the end result. I was 
lucky that I did in that particular case. 
 The other thing I concentrated on was making use of the 
British community in Costa Rica. In some countries, you have a 
lot of Brits who do not participate in putting forward a coherent 
view of the country, and yet they can be wonderfully helpful to 
the Embassy and good ambassadors for Britain if they are 
engaged. Over my time in San Jose, we did some great things 
together, whereby we collected money for Costa Rican schools in 
need; and the British community enjoyed being involved and 
appreciated. I think that the charity events we started still go on, 
as far as I know, which promote Britishness in all its different 




Could I add a postscript to that? I was one of the people who 
lived in Costa Rica when Georgina [Butler] was the Ambassador. 
When she stepped down, there was a serious attempt to have her 
made an honorary citizen of Costa Rica, which just shows you 
how much she was admired and loved. 
 
LAMONT There was a lovely headline in the Uruguayan press when I was 
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there, and I would have liked to take sole credit for that. It said, 
‘Improvement in agricultural arrangements under GATT83 thanks 
to British commitment.’ It made the French Ambassador 
physically ill, I am sure, and of course it was not due to me, but 
you are part of it. You are talking to the press and dealing with 
the Foreign Minister and people in London and Brussels who 
understand the issue, and you do have a certain degree of 
influence. In Venezuela, it would have been the whisky 
agreement that I mentioned, which was £20 million a year for 
Diageo.84 Later, three television journalists were released from 
prison; one of them came and said, ‘I do not know what you did 
but you must have done something.’ It was the way you deal with 
the President, whose decision it was to release them. 
 It is easier to claim credit for the small, self-contained 
things; in terms of the broader issues, you have to be realistic that 
you are a cog in the machine. The extent to which you can 
influence will vary. In the Falklands, as Governor, how you play it 
with the Councillors or, indeed, with the Argentine press, who 
loved the fact that there was a Spanish-speaking Governor – not 
every Falkland Islander did but the Argentines did – will affect 
things to a greater or lesser degree. You can quietly take credit for 
the self-contained; you are but part of the broader picture for the 
larger. 
 
HOOPER Congratulations to all of you on your achievements, and thank 
you, the questioner, for having caused them to confess their 
achievements. 
 
DANIEL REY What does the panel think the UK can do can to mitigate the 
effects in Latin America of the transnational trade in narcotics? 
 
HOOPER There are a few topics that we could have dealt with, and this is 
clearly one of them that is important. I am afraid that Central 
America is, again, a bit of a trafficking corridor, as is Mexico. 
 
PAXMAN I would start off by confessing that I do not think we did very 
much when I was in Mexico, partly because Britain and British 
interests were not directly affected. There was a huge drugs 
problem in Mexico, but it was essentially a problem of transit of 
                                                 
83 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, known as GATT. www.gatt.org 
[Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
84 ‘Diageo is a global leader in beverage alcohol with an outstanding collection of 
brands across spirits, beer and wine categories. These brands include Johnnie 
Walker, Crown Royal, JεB, Buchanan’s, Windsor and Bushmills whiskies, Smirnoff, 
Cîroc and Ketel One vodkas, Captain Morgan, Baileys, Don Julio, Tanqueray and 
Guinness.’ www.diageo.com [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
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drugs from Latin America – and particularly cocaine from 
Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia – coming through Mexico and 
getting into the [United] States. There was a problem of cannabis 
production, which there always had been, but again moving up to 
the States. There was also a problem with synthetic drugs such as 
methamphetamine being produced in Mexico and going up to the 
States, but not coming to Britain. I am afraid that I have to admit 
what we did was to keep a very close eye on what was going on 
and to look for ways in which British interests might be directly 
affected. Compared with the resources that the Americans could 
throw, and were throwing, at this problem, however, we were 
very much bit players and we felt that our resources were better 
used elsewhere. 
 
LAMONT I had two very different experiences. Uruguay, of course, has 
taken a very different view from prevailing opinion – although 
not a unique view – that a different path needs to be followed. 
Years and years ago, I was in our United Nations Department85 
and we dealt with narcotics. A very bright desk officer engaged 
intellectually in this issue and prepared a paper that said, ‘The UK 
is going to spend huge amounts of money unsuccessfully. We 
should change tack.’ The paper got nowhere because it was not 
an issue that people wished to address on that basis. Credit to 
Uruguay that it is addressing it and saying, ‘This international 
effort is not working, with vast amounts of money committed 
and criminalisation of the trade.’ 
 In Venezuela, our problem got worse because it was 
increasingly a transit country and stuff was coming across from 
Colombia. With drugs come weapons, and they were going to 
Trinidad & Tobago and into the Caribbean. We had a team 
operating from the Embassy and any judgment from London 
would say they were operating effectively and had a good 
relationship with the Venezuelans. We got the Special Forces86 in 
to help train the Venezuelans etc., but I think we were on a 
hiding to nothing. 
 
HOOPER I would point out that, in 1990, we held a drugs summit87 in 
London which, for the first time, brought together the people on 
the health side – the consequences of drug addiction – and those 
involved in policing and preventing the movement of drugs. It is 
not just policy in countries that are drug producers or where drug 
trafficking goes on which is an issue; it is the consumer countries. 
That has to be the European countries and, of course, North 
                                                 
85 First Secretary, UNIDO/IAEA, Vienna, 1977. 
86 http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-fighting-arms/royal-
marines/special-boat-service/special-boat-service [Accessed 16 Feb. 2015]. 
87 The World Ministerial Summit to Reduce Demand for Drugs and to Combat the 
Cocaine Threat, London, 9-11 Apr. 1990. 
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America and the United States in particular. The aim of that 
particular conference was to get those two sides together and to 
get some action going, and certain things came out of it but the 
problem has grown and grown. Maybe it is time we had another 
drugs summit. 
 
CAPURRO On a point of information, later this year we will have a Canning 
House drugs conference. We have had confirmation from ex-
President Gaviria88 that he will speak, and hopefully one or two 
other very senior Latin American politicians. As you know, they 
are driving a different agenda more along the lines of Uruguay, so 
keep in touch with Canning House and come along. 
 
HOOPER I would like to thank everybody for being here. I would like to 
thank those who have raised questions and those who will come 
again to Canning House, I hope, if you are first-timers. I 
particularly wish to thank our panel; they have all been very frank 
and open about what they have done and aspired to do. We are 
most grateful to them for giving their time this afternoon. I 
would also like to congratulate Tom Mills for having been the 
mastermind behind this particular event. On the programme, we 
talk about Canning House, so thanks to them, as well as King’s 
College London and Lancaster University. Thank you very much 
for organising this and I hope everybody will now join us for 
refreshments. Thanks again to the panel. 
                                                 
88 César Augusto Gaviria Trujillo, President of Colombia, 1990-4. 
52 
 
General economic indicators for Latin America, 201389 
 
 
                                                 
89 Compiled by Thomas Mills using WTO Trade Profiles by Country, 2014, available at: 





Share in world total 
imports (%) 
Share in world total 
exports (%) 
Argentina 41,446 611,755 0.39 0.43 
Bolivia 10,671 30,601 0.05 0.06 
Brazil 200,362 2,245,673 1.33 1.29 
Chile 17,620 277,199 0.42 0.41 
Colombia 48,321 378,148 0.31 0.31 
Costa Rica 4,872 49,621 0.10 0.06 
Cuba 11,266 68,234 0.08 0.03 
Ecuador 15,738 90,023 0.14 0.13 
El Salvador 6,340 24.259 0.06 0.03 
Guatemala 15,468 53,797 0.09 0.05 
Honduras 8,098 18,550 0.06 0.04 
Mexico 122,332 1,260,915 2.07 2.02 
Nicaragua 6,080 11,256 0.03 0.01 
Panama 3,864 42,648 0.12 0.08 
Paraguay 6,802 29,949 0.06 0.05 
Peru 30,376 202,296 0.23 0.22 
Uruguay 3,407 55,708 0.06 0.05 
Venezuela 30,405 438,284 0.28 0.47 
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Latin American imports: market shares, 2012 (%)90 
 
                                                 
90 Compiled by Thomas Mills from the ‘The Observatory of Economic Complexity’, available at: 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en [Accessed 2 June 2015]. 
 China United States United Kingdom Germany France 
Argentina 14.8 12.6 0.9 5.4 2.4 
Bolivia 11.7 10.2 0.8 1.8 0.7 
Brazil 15.0 14.2 1.6 6.6 2.7 
Chile 18.3 22.8 1.3 4.5 2.0 
Colombia 16.6 24.7 1.0 4 2.1 
Costa Rica 7.8 51.2 0.5 1.7 0.5 
Cuba 18.4 7.6 0.7 3.8 4.6 
Ecuador 11.2 26.7 1.8 2.7 0.7 
El Salvador 6.0 36.0 0.3 4.1 0.4 
Guatemala 7.8 37.2 0.3 1.7 0.5 
Honduras 8.3 44.2 0.3 1.9 0.4 
Mexico 16.9 46.7 0.7 4.2 1.1 
Nicaragua 9.4 17.0 0.3 1.0 0.5 
Panama 35.2 7.3 0.8 1.1 1.1 
Paraguay 27.8 8.4 0.5 1.8 0.8 
Peru 18.2 18.7 0.8 3.2 0.8 
Uruguay 14.1 7.3 0.9 2.6 1.8 
Venezuela 19.4 19.5 1.2 2.4 1.3 
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Latin American exports: destinations, 2012 (%)91 
 
 
                                                 
91 Compiled by Thomas Mills from the ‘The Observatory of Economic Complexity’, available at: 
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 China United States United Kingdom Germany France 
Argentina 6.3 5.4 1.2 2.6 0.5 
Bolivia 2.9 15.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 
Brazil 16.7 11.1 1.9 3.9 1.9 
Chile 23.1 12.2 1.0 1.8 1.7 
Colombia 5.3 35.3 2.5 1.4 0.6 
Costa Rica 5.0 39.4 1.1 1.6 0.8 
Cuba 30.3 0.0 2.9 3.2 2.6 
Ecuador 1.7 40.5 0.9 2.0 1.2 
El Salvador 0.2 46.2 0.4 1.8 0.2 
Guatemala 0.4 43.6 0.5 1.2 0.3 
Honduras 3.1 56.3 1.4 5.6 0.9 
Mexico 2.0 70.2 0.9 1.5 0.5 
Nicaragua 2.9 36.9 1.3 1.0 1.1 
Panama 0.9 4.8 0.5 0.6 0.3 
Paraguay 0.8 5.1 0.2 8.0 0.3 
Peru 16.7 13.8 1.0 4.2 0.7 
Uruguay 10.5 3.4 1.6 3.4 0.8 
Venezuela 31.8 2.5 1.6 1.5 0.8 
